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Procedural Safeguards for Periodic Review:
A New Commitment to Mental Patients' Rights
During the past decade, state and federal courts have begun to ex-
plore the degree of protection that the Constitution guarantees to
mental patients in the civil commitment process.' In Fasulo v. Arafeh,
2
the Connecticut Supreme Court became the first high court to find a
constitutional requirement of periodic review for civilly committed
patients.
3
1. The Supreme Court has decided eight cases touching on civil commitment pro-
cedures, half of which have appeared in the last six years. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (continued confinement of nondangerous patient who is not receiving
treatment violates "constitutional right to freedom"); McNeil v. Director of Patuxent
Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972) (denial of due process to continue to hold indefinitely
for observation without procedural safeguards); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730
(1972) (denial of equal protection for criminal defendant found incompetent to stand trial
to be committed without same procedural safeguards afforded to civilly committed);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1972) (remand to decide whether equal pro-
tection demands that renewal of commitment order originally issued in lieu of criminal
sentence must be governed by same procedures as civil commitment); Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (conviction as sex offender under one statute may not constitu-
tionally lead to additional commitment without procedural safeguards); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966) (judicial review required prior to civil commitment at
expiration of prison sentence); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711-12 (1962) (when
defendant has not pleaded insanity but has been acquitted on such grounds, hearing
required before commitment); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270,
274 (1940) (statute committing persons with psychopathic personalities not unconstitution-
ally vague); cf. Texas v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1977), prob. juris. noted, 435
U.S. 967 (1978) (Supreme Court to hear question of standard of proof in civil commit-
ment cases).
Lower federal courts have also begun to deal with important issues posed by civil com-
mitment. See, e.g., Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640, 648 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (three-judge court)
(statute authorizing commitment for those "in need of care" impermissibly vague);
Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Neb. 1975) (three-judge court) (commitment
statute unconstitutional because it failed to require adequate notice and failed to require
that dangerousness be evidenced by overt act).
State courts have been somewhat slower to respond to this trend toward establishing
new civil commitment rights. But see, e.g., Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553
(1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764
(1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 424 U.S. 960 (1976); In re Quesnell, 83 Wash.
2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973).
2. 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (1977).
3. See id. at 479-81, 378 A.2d at 556-57. Few other courts have commented on the need
for periodic review. But see Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1133-34 (D. Hawaii
1976) (dictum) (Constitution requires periodic review). It has been suggested that this
lack of attention can be explained by the fact that most patients are discharged "relatively
quickly" as the result of informal hospital administrative action. Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1377 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Developments]. But see NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, LENGTH OF
STAY OF ADMISSIONS TO STATE AND COUNTY 'MENTAL HosPrTALs UNITED STATES 1971, at 2
(1973) (statistics indicate substantial number of long-term commitments); Crane, Zonana
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Despite an increasing perception that periodic review is necessary,4
there has been relatively little discussion of how this review should be
implemented., Few commentators have focused on two distinct pur-
poses for civil commitment: preventive detention and treatment of the
mentally ill.6 Yet every state has based its standard for commitment on
one or both of these alternatives.
7
& Wizner, Implications of the Donaldson Decision: A Model for Periodic Review of Com-
mitted Patients, 28 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 827, 832 (1977) (study shows significant
number of long-term patients inappropriately placed in Connecticut state mental hospital).
Moreover, several state statutes authorize only a limited term of commitment. See, e.g.,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5304 (West Supp. 1978) (90 days); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 9.33 (McKinney 1978) (one or two years). Although over 30 states require some type of
periodic review, it is usually internal hospital review. See Developments, supra, at 1382-83.
4. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1133-34 (D. Hawaii 1976); Peck,
Current Legislative Issues Concerning the Right to Refuse Versus the Right to Choose
Hospitalization and Treatment, 38 PSYCH. 303, 308-09 (1975).
5. But see, e.g., Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (1977); Developments,
supra note 3, at 1376-98.
6. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1975) (outlining recognized ra-
tionales for civil commitment); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (same). These
two purposes are reflected in legislative standards governing civil commitment. A pre-
ventive detention standard covers those who are mentally ill and who are either dangerous
to themselves or others, or "gravely disabled." See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5260,
5300 (West 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-178 (1977). "Gravely disabled" is usually defined
as unable to care for one's basic needs. See, e.g., id. § 17-176. A therapeutic standard
usually authorizes the commitment of people found to be mentally ill and in need of
care or treatment. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5010 (Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 88-506.2 (Supp. 1978).
Some of these states qualify "in need of treatment" by specifying that the patient must
be incapable of making his own treatment decision. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(6)
(1978). The standard requires a determination of whether the patient is competent to
make a rational treatment choice. If the patient is not competent, the state makes the
treatment choice for him. But this determination of capacity and any subsequent proxy
treatment decision are really determinations of how seriously the patient needs treat-
ment. The court judges capacity by examining the reasonableness of the patient's refusal
to accept treatment. This judgment probably hinges on evaluation of the patient's symp-
toms and their susceptibility to treatment; thus the judge looks at how badly the patient
needs treatment.
The Supreme Court has declined at least one opportunity to rule on whether either
standard provides a constitutionally valid basis for confinement. See O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975); cf. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated on p~rocedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376
(E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (three-judge court) (lower court held only dangerousness
standard valid).
7. There are 28 statutes based on a preventive detention standard. See ALA. CODE
§ 22-52-10 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-408 (1971); CAL. WVELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 5260, 5300 (-Vest 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-109 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 17-178 (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 66-329 (Supp. 1978); Act of
Sept. 12, 1969, Pub. Act No. 76-1218, § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (Supp. 1977);
IND. CODE § 16-14-9.1-10 (Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229.1, .6 (West Supp. 1978);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28.55.E (West Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2334
(1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 12 (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 1, 8
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); MICH. CoMip. LAws ANN. §§ 330.1400-.1401 (1975 & Supp.
1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-71 (Supp. 1977); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 38-1208 (Supp.
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This Note analyzes the policy and constitutional considerations that
a legislature should take into account in implementing a periodic re-
view program. It suggests that both the policy and the constitutional
arguments for the three basic procedural safeguards mandated in
Fasulo8 are far more compelling under a preventive detention standard
than under a therapeutic one. The Note recommends the adoption of
all three of the Fasulo safeguards when the purpose of commitment is
preventive detention, but only two when the purpose is therapeutic. It
also proposes evidentiary rules that will further aid in the implementa-
tion of periodic review.
I. Fasulo and Considerations for Periodic Review
In most states, the mentally ill can be involuntarily hospitalized for
an indefinite length of time either by order of a panel of psychiatrists
or by judicial decree.9 The decision to commit hinges on meeting one
or both of the two basic standards for commitment, "dangerousness"
or "in need of treatment."
Release is usually at the discretion of the hospital superintendent,
but in rare instances, review by petitions for habeas corpus is used to
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.310 (1975); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:26 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6 (Supp. 1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 44A, §§ 3(c), (s), 55.2 (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 426.005(2), .130
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-604 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 37.1, 67.3 (1976); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.05.280 (1975); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.01,
.20 (West Supp. 1978).
Three statutes designed to fulfill the therapeutic goal are GA. CODE ANN. § 88-506.2
(Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.807 (Vernon 1978); N.Y. MENTAL HYc. LAW § 9.01
(McKinney 1978). S.C. CODE § 44-17-580 (Supp. 1977) authorizes commitment for treatment
regardless of whether the preventive detention goal is met, but permits commitment for
dangerousness only if treatment can be effective.
There are 16 statutes designed to fulfill both goals. See ALAsKA STAT. § 47.30.070 (1975);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(1) (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394A67 (West 1975); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.060-.080 (Baldwin Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.07 (West
Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-23 (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-5 (Supp.
1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.1-02, -07 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B) (Page
Supp. 1977); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7305 (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 26-2-1 to -3 (1956 & Supp. 1976); S.D. Cozi'. LAws ANN. § 27A-1-2 (1976); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-41, -51, -52 (Vernon 1958 & Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 64-7-36(6) (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7101, 7611 (Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-
112 (1977).
Three statutes are drafted so that an individual commitment is authorized only when
both goals are fulfilled simultaneously: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (1974); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 334-60(b)(1) (1976); KAN. ST.AT. ANN. § 59-2902 (Supp. 1977).
8. Fasulo held that periodic review must be implemented by a state-initiated, judicial
hearing in which the state must bear the burden of proof. 173 Conn. at 479-81, 378 A.2d
at 556-57. As a possible fourth safeguard, Fasulo added in dictum that the hearing should
be nonwaivable. Id. at 481-82, 378 A.2d at 557.
9. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1268-70.
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obtain release.' 0 These patient-initiated petitions can trigger hearings
in which the patient must carry the burden of demonstrating that he
no longer requires hospitalization."
A. Fasulo
Fasulo held that the due process clause of the Connecticut constitu-
tion 12 requires state-initiated periodic review to ensure the prompt re-
lease of patients who no longer need hospitalization.' 3 Although
Fasulo was technically decided under state law, its rationale may also
govern federal constitutional analysis because the Connecticut due
process clause is essentially identical to its federal counterpart, 14 and
because the Connecticut court relied primarily on the United States
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Be-
cause of Fasulo, and the possibility of similar holdings in other juris-
dictions, legislatures will need to consider how to design a statute that
comports with this due process requirement while also fulfilling the
chosen state goals that support civil commitment.
B. Flaws in the Fact-Finding Process
A number of problems in the civil commitment process must be
taken into account in order to design effective procedural safeguards.
These include the inherent biases of the several possible triers of fact,
the disabled condition of the patient, the state's superior access to and
control over much of the evidence, and the ambiguity of the standards
for commitment.
Psychiatrists and judicial officers traditionally have been employed
in commitment proceedings as arbiters or triers of fact. But each gToup
has its own bias that calls into question its ability to perform the role.
Potential psychiatric arbiters fall into three classes: the patient's own
physician, another hospital staff psychiatrist, or an unaffiliated psy-
10. A. BROOKs, LAW, PSYCHIATRY & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYsTEt 791 (1974); Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 1379-82.
11. Developments, supra note 3, at 1379-82.
12. CONN. CONsr. art. 1, § 8 ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. ... )
13. 173 Conn. at 479-81, 378 A.2d at 556-57.
Fasulo was an appeal from dismissals of two petitions for habeas corpus brought by
Yale Legal Services on behalf of Ann Fasulo and Marie Barbieri. Fasulo had been hospi-
talized for 26 years and Barbieri for 13. Neither patient's hospitalization had been
judicially reviewed since initial commitment. Id. at 473-75, 378 A.2d at 553-55.
14. Id. at 475-76, 378 A.2d at 554-55.
15. Fasulo, in balancing the substantive interests of the state and the individual, relied
on O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), McNeil v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 407
U.S. 245 (1972), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See 173 Conn. at 475-77, 378
A.2d at 555-57.
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chiatrist. Each class may suffer from a systematic predisposition with
respect to the release decision. The patient's own psychiatrist may be
careless, motivated to conceal past mistakes,' or simply too busy to
conduct adequate periodic review of seemingly chronic patients.17
Other state hospital psychiatrists may be reluctant to interfere with a
colleague's decision, because of professional courtesy,', fear of future
consequences,' 9 or loyalty to the institution.2 0
Psychiatrists in general, including those who are not affiliated with
the hospital, will tend to favor treatment for all those who need it.21
This might lead a psychiatric hearing officer to decline to release a
patient who is in need of treatment, regardless of the standard for
commitment. Medical ethics may conflict with the law when a physi-
cian has a legal duty to discharge a patient who needs treatment and
who may be harmed to some degree by release.2 2 In addition, phy-
sicians may be subject to civil suit for an erroneous determination
when a released patient injures a third party.2 3 Judges, by contrast,
16. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564-66, 572 & n.7 (1975) (jury awarded
punitive damages against defendant for malicious or wantonly careless acts of psychiatrist
in refusing to release patient).
17. It has been widely suggested that psychiatrists in state mental institutions are not
sufficiently diligent in finding satisfactory alternatives to hospitalization. See, e.g., A.
STRAUSS, L. SCHATZMAN, R. BUCHER, D. EHRLICH & M. SABSHIN, PSYCHIATRIC IDEOLOGIES AND
INSTITUTIONS 116-17 (1964) [hereinafter cited as A. STRAUSS]; Crane, Zonana & Wizner, supra
note 3, at 832-33; cf. pp. 866-67 infra (hospital should be required to find alternatives).
18. The commentary to § 1 of the AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND RE-
PORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 8 (1960) [hereinafter cited as OPINIoNs AND REPORT] provides
that -[a] physician should not take charge of, or prescribe for another physician's patient
during any given illness (except in an emergency) until the other physician has relin-
quished the case or has been formally dismissed."
19. See A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 35 (1976) (public
humiliation may be suffered by physician responsible for releasing patient who later
causes harm); Garcetti & Suarez, The Liability of Psychiatric Hospitals for tile Acts of
their Patients, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 961 (1968) (tort liability); Shestack, Psychiatry and the
Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH
CARE 10-11 (F. Ayd ed. 1974) (fear for reputation, considerations of promotion, community
pressures, and institutional economics).
20. See R. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 59-61 (1977) (implicit loyalty to
institution creates conflict with physician's relationship to patients); Shestack, supra note
19, at 9-12 (same).
21. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 21, 46-47 (1978)
(doctors tend to ignore legal standards of dangerousness and press for commitment when-
ever treatment is needed); Bazelon, The Adversary Process in Psychiatry (address to S.
Cal. Psych. Soc'y, Apr. 21, 1973), discussed in Shestack, supra note 19, at 11 (psychiatrists
often testify that patient is dangerous in order to provide treatment).
22. For example, the Hippocratic Oath provides that the physician will not use his
training in a manner that will in any way harm his patient. See A. CAMPBELL, MORAL
DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE 194-95 (1972). Yet releasing a patient the psychiatrist knows to be
in need of treatment is indeed harmful.
23. Compare Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1978) (judges have absolute
immunity from civil suit when they do not clearly act without jurisdiction) with Tarasoff
v. Regents, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 436-38, 551 P.2d 334, 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23-21 (1976)
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usually enjoy immunity from such suits, 24 but lack medical knowledge
and usually defer to the judgment of medical witnesses when psy-
chiatric questions are presented..
2 5
Another difficulty arises because the patient himself may be ham-
pered from communicating and producing evidence by his disabled
condition. 26 Moreover, the mentally ill are commonly stereotyped as
dangerous,2 7 and their often bizarre appearance may reinforce that
stereotype in the mind of a lay arbiter.
A third problem is the hospital's control over virtually all relevant
evidence. A hospital can manipulate both the contents of medical
records and the testimony of hospital staff.2 8 Social workers and nurses,
fearing dismissal, may be reluctant to testify contrary to the hospital
administration's wishes.
29
(cause of action exists against psychiatrist when he fails to warn victim of danger posed
by mental patient's release). But see Cameron v. State, 37 A.D.2d 46, 51, 322 N.Y.S.2d 562,
566 (1971), aff'd Per curiam, 30 N.Y.2d 596, 282 N.E.2d 118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1972) (hos-
pital has no "continuing duty to exercise parental role" after good faith release). In any
event, the question is not the actual liability but the perceived liability that creates the
psychiatrist's possible bias. Confusion as to what the rules of liability are will tend to
have a chilling effect on the psychiatrist.
24. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1978) (judge has absolute immunity
from civil suit when not clearly acting without jurisdiction).
25. See Chayet, Legal Neglect of the Mentally Ill, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 785, 790-91 (1968)
(study at New York's Bellevue hospital reveals commitment judge follows state psychia-
trist's recommendation in 75% of cases when patient is represented by counsel, and 97%
of cases when he is not); Wexler, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and
Practice in Arizona, 13 Aviz. L. REv. 1, 60 (1971) (Arizona study shows commitment judge
follows state psychiatrist's testimony in over 96% of cases).
Possible bias might be mitigated if both parties present medical witnesses. The patient,
however, will probably lack the resources to hire an expert witness. Moreover, assuming
an expert witness is willing to testify on behalf of the patient, the judge does not have
adequate training to give proper weight to the testimony of each psychiatrist. Consequently
there is no assurance that the quality of decisions will be better when two psychiatrists
testify, even if more patients are released.
The use of an independent psychiatric witness can prevent "hospital" bias. Several
states permit or require such testimony. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-178(c) (1977)
(requires); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.300 (Supp. 1977) (permits). An independent psychia-
trist will still suffer, however, from "treatment" bias, see p. 854 supra, and may testify,
even when in doubt, that a patient needs treatment. The judge may be unable to de-
termine when the psychiatrist is in doubt.
26. To a substantial degree, this difficulty may be caused by the effect of drugs. See
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CONTROLS ON THE USE OF PSYCHOTHERA-
PEUTIC DRUGS AND IMPROVED PSYCHIATRIC STAFFING ARE NEEDED IN VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
HOSPITALS 3, 4 (1975) (anxiety, tremors, loss of motor functions, restlessness); B. ENNIS &
R. EMERY, supra note 21, at 73, 140-41.
27. See Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 28 HOSPITAL &
COMMUNITY PSYCH. 817, 822 (1977); cf. Developments, supra note 3, at 1200 (many people
have irrational fear of mentally ill).
28. See A. BRooKS, supra note 10, at 791 (hospital has psychiatric expertise and op-
portunity to make record). Because the hospital is aware of the possibilities of litigation,
it can develop an inaccurate written history of the patient's hospitalization.
29. Cf. R. KHARASCH, THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE 33 (1973) (individuals who work
in goernment positions may accept institutional judgment because they do not wish to
be dismissed).
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Even if an independent psychiatrist is appointed to examine the
patient, he will be likely to rely heavily on the hospital records, and
will spend little time examining the patient himself.30 Consequently,
the content of the hearing record will be for the most part the content
of the hospital record.31
The possibility of unintentional inaccuracies in the hospital record
is substantial32 and the possibility of intentional inaccuracy cannot be
discounted. The hospital psychiatrist often views independent hear-
ings as unwarranted intrusions into the medical domain.33 Psychia-
trists have even been known to withdraw medication from a patient
prior to scheduled hearings in order to misrepresent the patient's
condition.
34
Finally, the standards for commitment are vague. When the state's
goal is preventive detention, a psychiatric prediction of dangerousness
unaccompanied by evidence of a recent overt act is frequently deemed
sufficient evidence to commit,35 even though it is not statistically
accurate. 36 Whenever the criteria for release are premised on the
validity of such predictions, the application of the criteria to patients
30. See, e.g., R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 148 (1968)
(Los Angeles study indicates prehearing examinations of patients average 30 minutes);
Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 383,
385 (1962) (court-appointed psychiatrists conduct hurried, assembly-line examinations).
31. See A. BROOKS, supra note 10, at 791.
32. Inaccuracies in the hospital record may arise, inter alia, from inexpert observations
of the nonprofessional staff who are in closest contact with the patient, see A. STRAUss,
supra note 17, at 249-55, and from a tendency to report and exaggerate only bad incidents,
see B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 21, at 190.
33. See, e.g., A. BROOKS, supra note 10, at 793 (quoting Davidson, Mental Hospitals
and the Civil Liberties Dilemma, 51 MENrAL HYGIENE 371 (1967)) (psychiatrist believes
that protecting civil rights may be injurious to patient welfare); Siegert, Discussion, 131
AM. J. PSYCH. 222 (1974) (psychiatrists not acting responsibly when, in effort to avoid
civil rights criticism, they hesitate to impose treatment believed to be in patient's interest).
34. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 21, at 193.
35. See, e.g., People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 321, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739 (1974)
(commitment in absence of prior harmful conduct not violative of due process); In re
Salem, 31 N.C. App. 57, 228 S.E.2d 649 (1976) (no overt act needed to establish dangerous-
ness). But see Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (overt act,
attempt, or threat needed in order to make finding of dangerousness).
A few statutes require that dangerousness be evidenced by a recent overt act. See, e.g.,
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §§ 1, 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972 & Supp. 1978); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.05.280 (1975). But see Note, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional
Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of tlhe Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
563, 585-93 (1977) (arguing against constitutional requirement of overt act).
36. See Kozol, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 371, 372 (1972) (statistics show psychiatrists unable to predict dangerousness ac-
curately without past history of violence); cf. B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 21, at 45
(statistics show that diagnosis of mental illness does not increase statistical likelihood of
violence).
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will probably be arbitrary.3 7 Furthermore, there is no scientific con-
sensus concerning what medical evidence should be sufficient to sup-
port a finding of dangerousness.3 8 Vagueness in both standards also
stems from the wide latitude that can be given to the words "mentally
ill,"' 9 and procedural safeguards are necessary to define and apply the
concept more precisely.
II. Solutions: Procedural Safeguards for Periodic Review
In order to develop an effective legislative solution to potential
problems of periodic review, it is necessary to establish whether the
hearing mandated in Fasulo is to be nonwaivable, to determine the
best trier of fact, to allocate the burden of proof, and to prescribe a
set of evidentiary rules.40 The choices made will stem in part from
the civil commitment goal or goals that the state chooses.41
A. A Nonwaivable Hearing
Legislatures should mandate that the required periodic review hear-
ing be nonwaivable. Only a nonwaivable hearing will adequately im-
37. See B. ENNIS & R. EmERY, supra note 21, at 46 (attorneys involved in civil com-
mitment believe dangerousness standard arbitrarily applied). But see Monahan, Prediction
Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Re-
consideration, 135 Am. J. PSYCH. 198 (1978) (psychiatrist suggests circumstances surround-
ing short-term emergency commitment of persons predicted to be imminently dangerous
may allow greater statistical accuracy in prediction than found in commitment generally).
38. Clinicians may base their predictions of dangerousness upon various factors. A
recent overt act is often used. R. RocK, supra note 30, at 240. In the absence of an overt
act clinicians have theorized dangerousness on the basis of morbid jealousy; a sense of
helplessness coupled with rage; a combination of enuresis, firesetting, and cruelty to
animals; a history of parental violence; drug or alcohol usage; and hypersensitivity to
close body contact. See A. STONE, supra note 19, at 30. But most of these theories have
been criticized as poorly documented, and it has been hypothesized that most psychiatrists
rely primarily on their own intuition rather than mechanical tests. See id.; cf. pp. 865-66
infra (overt act should be required before dangerousness can be found).
39. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum) (psychiatrists define
mental illness in terms of deviating from social norm); T. SzAsz, THE MANUFAcrtURE OF
MAoNrss 68 (1971) (same). Virtually everyone differs somewhat from the social norm. Thus
a person may well be mentally ill and need treatment, but still be able to live safely in
freedom. Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (state not justified in
involuntarily confining persons who are mentally ill but who are harmless).
40. This Note does not discuss two other procedural issues that are discussed at length
in Developments, supra note 3, at 1283-91, 1303-13, 1395, and have generated little con-
troversy: the right to counsel and the apparent lack of a right to refuse examination as
self-incrimination. But see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated
on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318
(E.D. Wis. 1976) (three-judge court) (examination violates right against self-incrimina-
tion).
41. See p. 851 supra.
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plement the patient's right to periodic review. Mental patients are
generally ignorant of their rights. 42 When patients wish to leave the
hospital, they will usually be subjected to institutional pressure that
may prevent them from exercising that right.43 Even if a patient
actually chooses to forego periodic review, he may be incapable of a
knowing waiver.44 A mandatory hearing thus protects the patient's
rights and avoids any implication of noncooperation that may arise
from not waiving state-initiated review.
45
B. The Trier of Fact
Although the trier of fact ought to be neutral, all candidates for that
position have some systematic tendencies that may hinder their ability
to render an impartial decision. 46 The question, therefore, is whether
these various biases are strong enough to warrant disqualification.
47
The determination of the proper trier of fact will depend on the
commitment goal that the state has chosen. But regardless of the goal
sought, the trier of fact should be independent of the hospital, and the
selection narrowed to either an unaffiliated psychiatrist or a judge.
The potential biases of internal review and the accompanying ap-
pearance of impropriety warrant going outside the hospital to find an
arbiter.
48
42. See State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 866, 269 S.W.2d 7, 12 (1954) (hear-
ing must be mandatory because of patients' general ignorance of rights).
43. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Hygiene, No. 73-19434 AW (Cir. Ct.
Wayne County, Mich. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BRooKs, supra note 10, at 907, 911
(hospital atmosphere inherently coercive); Developments, supra note 3, at 1354 (patients
may assume only way out of hospital is cooperation with staff).
44. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on procedural
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated on
procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
(three-judge court) (hearing should not be waivable because patient may be incapable of
knowing waiver); Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 482, 378 A.2d 553, 557 (1977) (dictum)
(patient incapable of knowing waiver of hearing).
45. Cf. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 51, 77 (1961) (patients can be educated about price they
will pay for making demands on their own behalf with regard to legal rights).
46. See pp. 854-55 supra.
47. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482,
491-95 (1976) (court apparently weighs state's interest in retaining biased trier of fact).
Among the biases that courts have held sufficient for the disqualification of judges or
administrative board members are pecuniary interest in the outcome, see Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge unconstitutionally biased when paid only if defendant is con-
victed); prior judgment of the case before a full review has been conducted, see Nilva v.
United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957) (in contempt proceeding, judge who presided over case
in which alleged contempt occurred has discretion to withdraw); and close affiliation with
either party in interest, see Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir.
1941) (participation in labor dispute warrants disqualification of Board member from
ruling on same unfair labor practice). See generally K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVI LAW
TREATISE § 12.02 (1958 & Supp. 1978).
48. For the potential biases of internal review, see p. 854 supra. Cf. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972) (deprivation of liberty in parole revocation warrants
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1. The Therapeutic Goal
The conflict between the two possible goals of civil commitment be-
comes apparent when one compares the biases of psychiatrists to those
of judges. If the legal standard is designed to approach a medical one,40
such as "in need of treatment," a doctor's bias in favor of treatment
and tendency to apply a medical standard will not adversely affect the
desired goal. Because a psychiatric arbiter is trained to diagnose and
treat mental illness, he appears best qualified to appraise the evidence
bearing on a patient's need for treatment.50 A nonmedical arbiter who
receives psychiatric testimony will have little knowledge with which to
evaluate the credibility of the witness. 51 A layman may also over-
emphasize the patient's eccentricity in determining the need for
hospitalization.5 2
neutral adjudicator outside parole board). Internal review necessarily involves a prior
judgment analogous to that in Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957), because the
hospital has already made an initial decision not to release the patient. In addition,
internal review establishes the moving party, i.e., the hospital, as arbiter. This is arguably
a closer association than was present in Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235
(3d Cir. 1941) (participant in labor dispute). Finally, the state also has an interest in
preserving a sense of propriety when choosing a trier of fact. Propriety depends on ap-
pearance and on the potential harm that bias can cause, rather than on proven harm.
There may be two interests in providing only hospital review. The patient's own
psychiatrist might be chosen because he is most familiar with the patient's illness. See
M. GUTTMACHER & H. 'VEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 302 (1952). But the state
hospital psychiatrist may have little contact with his patients, and the time required for
another psychiatrist to achieve an equal familiarity would consequently be minimal. See
N. KITTRIE, TIHE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 98 (1971); R. ROCK, supra note 30, at 55, 69-71;
A. STRAUss, suPra note 17, at 95-96, 125 (little psychiatric attention to chronic wards).
Consequently, the problems caused by inherent biases, see p. 854 supra, outweigh the use-
fulness of the patient's own psychiatrist.
Choosing a hospital-affiliated psychiatrist might promote more effective treatment since
a patient may be more cooperative if he knows that only the hospital can release him.
But the patient may not be aware of a right to periodic review, see p. 858 supra, and
periodic review would probably not be so frequent that it would be practical for the
patient to wait for a new hearing rather than cooperate with the hospital staff.
Moreover, since the patient still may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see Develop-
ments, supra note 3, at 138 & n.22 (listing habeas statutes for 50 states and District of
Columbia), the additional outlet of periodic review should not seriously alter the patient's
perception of the degree of cooperation necessary to leave the hospital.
49. Ideally, the legal standard would be only a subcategory of a medical one, and
would explicitly be narrowed to encompass an individual's need for treatment in a mental
hospital. An evidentiary requirement that the hospital show that it is the least restrictive
environment in which treatment can be administered would help accomplish this narrow-
ing of standards. See pp. 866-67 infra (suggesting this requirement).
50. See R. ROCK, supra note 30, at 259-60 (lay arbiter cannot accurately evaluate need
for treatment in mental hospital and patient's prognosis, whereas psychiatric arbiter can).
But see Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 897, 903-04 (1975) (judges have ability to evaluate expert testimony on
need for treatment).
51. See R. ROCK, supra note 30, at 259-60. As a practical matter, nonmedical arbiters
rely almost exclusively on psychiatric opinion when medical questions are in issue. See
p. 855 supra.
52. See p. 855 supra.
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Finally, although a medical arbiter will suffer from a treatment bias
and is likely to give less weight to the patient's liberty interest than
would a judge,53 this is not a serious problem in periodic review be-
cause the state has already had some opportunity to treat the patient
and psychiatrists regard prolonged hospitalization as antitherapeutic. 54
2. The Preventive Detention Goal
If the legal standard is dangerousness, a physician's tendency to
commit all those who need treatment will defeat the chosen state goal.
Although it would be inconsistent with medical ethics for a psychia-
trist to violate the law, 55 the physician will tend, as a practical matter,
to disregard a dangerousness standard.56
Moreover, psychiatrists have no special ability to diagnose danger-
ousness.57 Judges, on the other hand, are experienced in deciding mixed
ethical, legal, social, and medical questions that arise under a danger-
ousness standard.58 A judge can weigh the seriousness of the patient's
alleged dangerous acts59 along with the likelihood that the patient
will repeat those acts. This process is similar to and draws from a
53. See pp. 854, 856 supra.
54. See Post-Trial Amici Curiae Memorandum of Law of American Psychological As-
sociation, American Orthopsychiatric Association, and American Civil Liberties Union for
Plaintiff, Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), quoted in 1 B. ENNIs
P. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 439 (1973).
A psychiatric arbiter may also be reluctant-either from fear of tort liability or from a
sense of medical ethics-to release a patient who is thought to be dangerous, independent
of the patient's need for treatment. See pp. 854, 856 supra. The tort problem can be
cured by giving the arbiter judicial immunity for his quasi-judicial acts. Although the
"ethical" bias still remains, it should not have a significant effect on the vast majority of
recommitment decisions because the mentally ill, as a societal class, are not dangerous.
See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 21, at 45.
Consequently the special expertise required for "treatment" hearings, see note 25 supra,
outweighs the possible detriment from the inherent biases of psychiatric arbiters. It is
more questionable, however, whether choosing a psychiatric arbiter for initial commitment
would result in a satisfactory balancing of expertise against biases that may impinge on
a patient's liberty interest. But see S. BRAKEL & R. RocK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAw 59-60 (rev. ed. 1971) (American Psychiatric Association recommends that commit-
ment be left entirely to psychiatrists).
55. See OPINIONS AND REPORT, supra note 18, § 4, at 23 ("[P]hysicians should observe
all laws .... )
56. See p. 854 supra.
57. See A. STONE, supra note 19, at 25-40 (studies show psychiatrists unable to predict
better than laymen, and-more likely to overpredict); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On
the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. Rrv. 75, 85 & n.29 (1968) (psychia-
trists have no special ability to predict dangerousness).
58. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 21, at 66; Bazelon, supra note 50.
59. See pp. 865-66 infra (crucial issue in dangerousness commitment hearings should
be dangerous acts of patient).
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judge's considerable experience in sentencing.0° A doctor's expertise
is unrelated to such inquiries.61
In sum, the choice of a trier of fact depends on which of the two
basic civil commitment goals a state has selected. Under a therapeutic
goal the optimal arbiter is the unaffiliated psychiatrist. Under a pre-
ventive detention standard, a trained judge is preferable.
2
C. Allocation of the Proof Burden
It is also important to focus on the civil commitment goals in
deciding who should bear the burden of proof and what the standard of
proof should be. Proper allocation of the proof burden will serve both
to affirm societal value judgments and to correct inherent flaws in the
proceeding that favor the state. 3
1. Societal Value Judgments
The allocation of a heavy burden of proof to the state in periodic
review affirms a societal value judgment regarding involuntary hospi-
talization that results from balancing the state's interest against the
individual's. The most analogous state proceeding in which physical
liberty is at stake is the criminal trial.64 The decision to require the
60. The relevant inquiries in sentencing involve, inter alia, the likelihood of the
criminal's engaging in further criminal activity and the criminal's rehabilitation. Re-
search suggests that rehabilitation, like dangerousness, cannot be observed, detected, or
measured. See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE
L.J. 810, 826, 855 (1975).
61. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 21, at 66 (doctors, unlike judges, not trained
in impartial adjudication, taking evidence or protecting legal rights); R. ROCK, suPra
note 30, at 260 (doctors accustomed to dealing from position of authority in doctor-patient
relationship and likely to substitute administrative convenience for patient welfare).
62. When both goals are employed, and the patient can be committed under either
standard, see note 7 supra, two hearings will be required since "dangerousness" and "in
need of treatment" are not complete subsets of each other. The dangerousness hearing
should be conducted first so that there is less chance that the psychiatrist in the cor-
responding "treatment" hearing will feel compelled to make a dangerousness judgment.
See note 54 supra (possibility of physician trying to hospitalize nontreatable dangerous
patients).
63. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970) (approving such analysis in
criminal context); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 60 (1961) (allocation in
civil suits should depend on access to knowledge, extent that party's contentions depart
from ordinary experience, and other policy judgments); Underwood, The Thumb on the
Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1306-08
(1977) (approving such analysis). Burden of proof of a fact is discharged when the trier
of fact has been persuaded by sufficient evidence of the truth of the fact to be proved.
MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); cf. Texas
v. Addington, 557 S.V.2d 511 (Tex. 1977), prob. furis, noted, 435 U.S. 967 (1978) (Supreme
Court may address burden-of-proof issue in initial commitment).
64. Although the parole process also involves a liberty interest, it is distinct from the
interests involved in either the civil commitment process or the criminal trial. A person
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state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt reflects a judgment that
it is better to allow a guilty defendant to go free than to convict an
innocent one.65 The deprivation of liberty suffered by committed
patients is largely the same as that suffered by convicted criminals. In
addition, although civil commitment is not intended to carry the op-
probrium that normally attaches to criminal conviction, it carries its
own equally damaging stigmatic effect.66
The state's interest in preventing the release of patients who should
be committed depends on the commitment goal or goals that the state
has selected. Society may suffer harm from the release of a truly dan-
gerous patient. Yet identifiable classes of criminal defendants, such as
repeat offenders, present a similar danger, and the criminal value
judgment still demands that the state bear the burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. It is therefore appropriate that the state bear the
burden of proof in civil commitment. That burden, moreover, should
going through the parole process has only a conditional liberty interest, because the
societal value judgments that deprived him of his liberty for a fixed period of time have
already been made. At the time of the parole hearing-a point at which the society
voluntarily undertakes to reexamine its judgments-the individual's liberty interest has
changed. But society's interests, which include general deterrence and retribution, remain
the same.
Societal interests in detaining a person alleged to be mentally ill cease when the purpose
for the detention no longer exists. The society's interests do not include retribution and
deterrence, because there is nothing to punish and in many cases nothing that can be
deterred. In criminal trials individual liberty interests are preserved by the presumption
of innocence until the verdict is rendered. Society's interest in retribution comes into play
only after an individual has been convicted of a crime. Thus the civil commitment pro-
cess, in terms of the societal interests involved, is much closer to the initial trial than to
the parole stage of the criminal process.
The only civil case in which a party, whose physical liberty is at stake, must bear the
burden of proof is in a habeas corpus hearing. Such a quasi-appellate hearing is not
analogous to periodic review because periodic review is concerned with current status
rather than the propriety of initial confinement. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1386.
65. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Underwood,
supra note 63, at 1307.
66. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1193-94. Commentators believe that former
mental patients are generally feared, loathed, or distrusted. See, e.g., B. ENNIS, PRIsoeNs
OF PSYCHIATRY-MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAwv 160-76 (1972) (citing
examples of discrimination).
A commonly offered but meritless distinction between imprisonment and civil commit-
ment is that falsely committed nondangerous patients may still receive benefit through
treatment. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1231-35. If the patient's illness cannot be
treated-or if there is no illness to treat-the patient receives no benefit. Moreover danger-
ousness is not treatable per se. Thus when the symptoms disappear, there is no guarantee
that the patient will no longer be dangerous and in need of confinement. See note 57
supra (citing studies); B. ENNIS & R. EMrERY, supra note 21, at 47 (no ability to treat); A.
STONE, supra note 19, at 36-37 (same). In fact, under a dangerousness standard the state
may not even be required to provide treatment. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 574 (1975). Thus treatment does not compensate for deprivation of liberty, and is
poor consolation for false commitment.
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be to prove dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.67 Even when a
defendant has a history of violent crime, the Constitution requires that
the state bear such a heavy burden. 68 The potential harm to society
from releasing the dangerous mentally ill is no greater than from
releasing dangerous criminals. 69
Finally, it would not make sense to lower the burden of proof when
the therapeutic standard is employed. The deprivation of liberty under
a therapeutic standard is identical to that under a preventive detention
standard, but the potential societal harm of releasing those who need
treatment is much lower.70 Thus societal value judgments under both
standards demand that the state bear a very heavy burden of proof to
continue hospitalizing a civilly committed patient.
2. Additional Considerations in Cases Decided Under the
Dangerousness Standard
In the case of patients committed under a dangerousness standard,
there are additional reasons to put the burden of proof on the state.
These reasons all stem from the need to compensate for the flaws in
the commitment process that favor the state.
When dangerousness is at issue, the patient's disabled condition may
67. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring proof beyond reason-
able doubt); Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Commitment Proceedings, 1977
Drr. C.L. REv. 209 (urging reasonable doubt standard). But see Texas v. Addington, 557
S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1977), prob. juris. noted, 435 U.S. 967 (1978) (clear and convincing
evidence). See generally Developments, suPra note 3, at 1295-1303 (discussing how state
can meet reasonable doubt burden despite vagueness of standards that might always
enable patient to raise reasonable doubt).
68. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502-03 (1975) (guilt must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt for alleged assault with intent to commit murder with malice
when defendant "struck landlord with knife in neck, chest, and abdomen, severely wound-
ing him"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (guilt must be established beyond
reasonable doubt in all criminal trials).
69. There may be even greater harm in releasing dangerous criminals than in releasing
dangerous mental patients. One function of criminal law is its deterrent effect. Acquitting
a larger segment of guilty defendants by requiring that the state bear a heavy burden of
proof undermines to some extent this deterrent effect. Commitment may not have a
bimilar deterrent effect because some dangerous mentally ill do not have sufficient con-
trol over their actions to alter them in order to avoid risking commitment. Thus, requir-
ing that the state bear a heavy burden would not significantly undermine any deterrent
effect.
70. The commonly offered rationale for not releasing patients in need of treatment is
potential harm to the individual patient rather than to society. See, e.g., M. GUTTMACHER
& H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 48, at 288-92; Developments, supra note 3, at 1223-25. Perhaps
continued confinement results not from a belief in dangerousness or need for treatment,
but from a desire to grant friends, relatives, and neighbors relief from the nuisance of
having to care for and deal with the patient. See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 45, at 384. But
harm to the patient or nuisance to caretakers should be seen as less serious than dangerous
acts against other persons in determining the weight of the state interest in confinement.
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complicate his ability to give testimony and may prejudice the trier
of fact.7 1 Yet the patient's testimony is necessary72 since weight will be
given to his past dangerous acts.73 The patient must be able to rebut
adverse testimony by claiming that the acts never took place or by ex-
plaining why they were not dangerous.
Second, the hospital has a much greater opportunity to develop a
record.74 Because it knows that litigation is possible, the hospital staff
may depict the patient's condition inaccurately.7 5 Moreover, making
an accurate determination of dangerousness requires reports on be-
havior that span several weeks. 6 Thus in most cases it will be im-
practical for the arbiter himself to amass an adequate record.
Third, allocating the burden of proof to the patient could elevate
the vagueness problems of a dangerousness standard to unconstitu-
tional proportions.77 The Supreme Court has employed the void-for-
vagueness doctrine to invalidate statutes that establish nonjusticiable
standards or that chill fundamental rights by failing to give adequate
71. See p. 855 sup ra.
72. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1282.
Some psychiatrists claim that the traumatic effect of having the patient attend the
commitment hearing outweighs the possible benefits, see M. GUrrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN,
supra note 48, at 295-98, but many of these traumatic effects can be greatly lessened by
informal procedures that still comport with due process. In addition, the patient has
probably been so traumatized by the entire process of hospitalization that the hearing
will add little more to the patient's discomfort. See Developments, supra note 3, at
1273-75.
73. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123, §§ 1, 8 (MichiefLaw. Co-op Supp. 1978) (re-
quires proof of overt dangerous act for commitment); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(3)
(Supp. 1977) (same); Note, supra note 35, at 575-78 (overt acts major factor in determining
dangerousness).
74. One important factor in allocating the burden of proof is determining which
party has better access to and control over the evidence. See James, supra note 63, at 60.
Considerations of control over records also apply to cases in which a treatment standard
is used, but are less important there because the record is less likely to be exaggerated or
falsified if the hospital staff believes that treatment will be provided if needed. Such a
belief is more likely to exist when the arbiter is a psychiatrist rather than a judge.
Regardless of the allocation of the burden of proof, the patient and his counsel should
have complete access to all materials in the hospital record in order to build a proper
case. There may be instances in which a hospital has bona fide treatment-related reasons
for not wishing a patient to see all of his own files. But at the very least, that judgment
should be made by the arbiter rather than by an interested party.
75. See pp. 855-56 supra.
76. See, e.g., Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1268-69 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd sub
nora. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) (45-day observation period reasonable and
necessary).
77. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court held that a burden of proof
that forced a plaintiff to demonstrate that his speech was not "subversive" unconstitu-
tionally chilled free expression. Similarly, requiring the patient to prove that his conduct
is not "dangerous" may impermissibly chill the patient's constitutional interest in liberty
by forcing him to restrict his speech and conduct greatly.
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notice of what constitutes proscribed conduct.78 Putting the burden
of proof on the patient might do both. Predictions of dangerousness,
when made without the benefit of any recent overt act, are not
justiciable because they usually are statistically unreliable. 79 Funda-
mental rights of speech, movement, and association might be chilled
because the patient would not know which actions might trigger pre-
ventive detention.80 Thus the need to offset these inherent flaws in
dangerousness cases provides an independent ground for placing a
heavy burden of proof on the state in these periodic review hearings.
D. Evidentiary Standards
Choosing the optimal trier of fact and allocating the burden of proof
correctly, however, are not sufficient to cure all the defects inherent in
periodic review. Substantive evidentiary rules must also be properly
structured.
1. The Overt Act Rule
Under a preventive detention standard, it is uncertain what evidence
should be required for a finding of dangerousness.81 The best available
test would require that dangerousness be evidenced by a recent overt
act.8 2 The overt act should be one that reasonably could be expected
to cause physical harm to a person.83 Both the recentness and the
78. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-70 (1972); Giaccio
v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939). See generally Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARv.
L. REv. 77 (1948); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
79. See p. 856 supra.
80. Confinement could rest on a determination of mental illness alone, because, in the
absence of an overt act requirement, there would be no way to disprove dangerousness.
See pp. 856-57 supra. Consequently, conduct and speech unrelated to dangerous activity
might be chilled because the potential patient would have no way of knowing which
assortment of actions and speech might be deemed symptoms of dangerousness.
The result would be even worse if the burden of proof were applied conscientiously.
Because no patient can affirmatively show that he is not dangerous without an overt act
rule, the arbiter would always hospitalize the patient.
81. See pp. 856-57 supra.
82. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1205-06. But see Note, supra note 35, at 589
(suggesting other tests that might cure vagueness problems).
83. The overt act requirement should not be satisfied by a showing of repulsion,
annoyance, or threatened property damage unless the threat could reasonably be expected
to extend also to physical injury to persons. See Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1109
(D. Hawaii 1977).
In addition, there should be a presumption against continuing confinement. Most acts
that occurred prior to initial commitment should not on periodic review be sufficient to
warrant further hospitalization unless those acts were gravely injurious. Hospital incidents
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gravity of the act committed should be considered. In addition, the
state ought to have the burden of pleading and proving the overt act
beyond a reasonable doubt.8 4 Finally, because a lay arbiter will tend to
rely heavily on medical opinion,85 psychiatric conclusions as to dan-
gerousness, even if based on recent overt acts, should be inadmissible.
Such an overt act rule would ameliorate the defects in the commit-
ment proceeding. The prejudicial effect of a patient's unconventional
appearance may be lessened by explicitly restricting the court's inquiry
to the occurrence of dangerous acts.8 6 Requiring the state to produce
evidence of dangerousness would limit the degree to which a hospital's
exaggeration of incidents could affect the outcome of a case. Because
a patently dangerous incident is likely to be easily recognized, a report
of it would tend to be more reliable than would reports of bizarre or
uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, such a rule would avoid sub-
stantial vagueness problems. Acts likely to cause or precede harm to
life constitute a fairly understandable category that gives fair notice to
committed patients.
8 7
2. The Least-Restrictive-Means Rule
Another evidentiary standard that should be adopted by states is a
least-restrictive-means rule. This rule would require the state to prove
that the hospital is the least physically restrictive placement necessary
for either treatment or preventive detention,88 and to investigate and
report all reasonable alternative placements to the arbiter. Possible
placements might include the patient's home, the homes of friends or
relatives, halfway houses, or nursing homes. The report should also
indicate why such alternatives were inappropriate.
The least-restrictive-means rule would narrow the scope of the "in
need of treatment" standard by limiting it to treatment that only a
hospital can provide. Often patients need treatment in some structured
should be the dominant factor in recommitment decisions. The hospital by its nature may
either inhibit harmful activity or, by frustrating the patient, provoke him to violence.
Thus the arbiter must weigh the circumstances under which the violent acts occurred in
deciding their probative value.
84. See pp. 861-65 supra.
85. See p. 855 supra.
86. Although this would not counteract any intentional bias, it would put the arbiter
on notice that he must not base his findings solely on the patient's appearance.
87. See Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 183-84, 339 A.2d
764, 778-79 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 424 U.S. 960 (1976) (overt act rule
provides fair notice).
88. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1245-53 (discussing least-restrictive-means doc-
trine); cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960) (requiring state to choose least
drastic means available for accomplishing goals when First Amendment rights may be
affected).
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environment but do not require the constant supervision provided in
a mental hospital. 80 The state should bear the burden of proof because
it usually has the best knowledge of the facilities available and should,
as a matter of policy, be encouraged to search out alternative place-
ments for its patients.90
Conclusion
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Fasulo v. Arafeh9'
that periodic review for civilly committed mental patients is con-
stitutionally mandated presents a challenge to all legislatures to provide
procedural safeguards that ensure that periodic review comports with
the requirements of due process. This Note has suggested some of the
practical and constitutional factors that both the legislature and the
judiciary should consider in implementing such periodic review safe-
guards.
89. See Crane, Zonana & Wizner, supra note 3, at 832-33 (study shows significant
number of long-term hospital patients suitable for less restrictive placement).
90. See id. (hospital should assume more active role in review and discharge planning).
91. 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (1977).
